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Abstract
There is a large empirical literature on policy measures targeted at chil-
dren but surprisingly very little theoretical foundation to ground the debate
on the optimality of the diﬀerent instruments. In the present paper, we ex-
amine the merit of targeting children through two general policies, namely
selective commodity taxation and cash transfer to family with children. We
consider a household that comprises an adult and a child. The household be-
havior is described by the maximization of the adult’s utility function, which
depends on the child’s welfare, subject to a budget constraint. The relative
eﬀects of a price subsidy and of a cash beneﬁt on child welfare are then de-
rived. In particular, it is shown that ‘favorable’ distortions from the price
subsidies may allow to redistribute toward the child. The framework is ex-
tended to account for possible paternalistic preferences of the State. Finally,
it is shown that, in contrast to the traditional view, well-chosen subsidies
c a nb em o r ec o s te ﬀective than cash transfers in alleviating child poverty.
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11 Introduction
The rise in child poverty is a recent source of concern for governments in devel-
oped countries.1 In response to a tightening of government ﬁnance, however, the
emphasis on designing eﬃcient poverty-alleviation programs is central. One of the
most natural policy to improve child welfare consists in making cash transfers to
families with children. This raises issues of agency because cash transfers are not
made directly to the intended recipients (i.e., children), but supplement instead
the income of adults with the assumption that the standard of living of children
will improve as well. Even if adults and children are altruistically linked, decisions
r e g a r d i n gc h i l d r e n ’ sc o n s u m p t i o na r eu l t i m a t e l ym a d eb ya d u l t sa n dt h ei m p a c t
of cash transfers may be partially or totally neutralized by the intra-household
redistribution process.
Typically, cash transfers do not create distortions and have only an income eﬀect
on household behavior. A completely diﬀerent strategy to improve child standard
of living consists in modifying the price structure by subsidizing (or taxing) some
well-chosen goods. The change in consumer prices due to subsidies will then create
a distortion of the household consumption bundle that may be favorable to children.
The result seems straightforward in the case of child-speciﬁcg o o d s :p r i c ec u t sm a y
incite parents to purchase these goods and hence improve children’s situation. Yet,
the ﬁnal impact on child welfare remains unclear since the subsidies may be oﬀset
by a reduction of intra-household allocations to children. To which extent these
‘favorable’ distortions can be used as a targeting device is an open question.
Despite the large literature on child poverty, there are surprisingly little theo-
retical grounds to assess alternative policies in the light of intra-household mech-
anisms.2 The present paper contributes ﬁlling the gap. We consider a household
comprising an egoistic child and a benevolent adult and suppose that the decisions
about consumption are exclusively made by the adult. This simple framework
allows us to characterize how variations in income and prices may aﬀect the well-
being of children and adults within the household. By this means, we can examine
t h ec o s te ﬃciency of price subsidies and cash transfers in improving the child wel-
1This is illustrated by numerous recent books and articles. The concern is especially acute in
t h eU Sa n di nt h eU K .I nt h eU K ,f o ri n s t a n c e ,t h eo ﬃcial objective of the Labour Government is
to "eradicate child poverty" within 20 years. The recent policy orientations for that purpose are
evaluated by Sutherland and Piachaud (2001). Dickens and Ellwood (2003) suggest a comparison
of child poverty in the US and the UK.
2One of the rare exceptions is presented by Cigno et al. (2003). These authors use a principal—
agent framework to study government policies that aim at improving the welfare of children.
2fare in a representative household or in reducing child poverty in a continuum of
households.3 In particular, we suggest an original deﬁnition of child poverty based
on the income accruing to the child, while the usual practice assumes instead that
a poor child is one living in a poor family. Remark that we focuses in this paper
on instantaneous ﬁnancial poverty and not on questions and policies related to
children’s development, equality of opportunities and lifetime poverty.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, we formally derive the
conditions under which a subsidy placed on a particular good — whether consumed
by both members or only by the child — improves child welfare. We also suggest a
simple rule to select goods for which the subsidy will have the largest impact on
child welfare. Second, we characterize the level of subsidy below which this policy
dominates a cash beneﬁt, when both instruments are implemented on the same cost
basis. We study how results are altered when the social planner has paternalistic
preferences. Third, we derive the conditions under which price subsidies dominate
cash transfers in child poverty reduction. The traditional view tends to favor cash
transfers since subsidies increase with the level of income and hence are less targeted
at the poorest. Yet, in the case of child poverty, the intra-household redistribution
due to price distortions counteracts this eﬀe c ta n dp r o v i d e sa na r g u m e n ti nf a v o r
of subsidies.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present an overview of
the empirical research on policies designed to reduce child poverty. In Section 3,
we describe the altruistic model of household behavior and its implications on the
intra-household distribution of resources. In Section 4, we compute the impact of
the subsidies and cash transfers on the child’s welfare. In Section 5, we evaluate
the eﬃciency of both policies on child poverty. Section 6 concludes.
2 What Do Empirical Studies Tell Us?
Before presenting the model and our theoretical results, it is interesting to review
the empirical ﬁndings on how children beneﬁt from the current economic policies
designed to alleviate child poverty. There is a large stream of empirical research
that examines the eﬃciency of the recent pro-child reforms carried out in indus-
trialized countries. Even if these results are not conclusive on what should be the
3The approach is inspired from the literature on targeting but diﬀers to the extent that the
targeted person is located within a household. See Kanbur and Stern (1987), Besley and Kanbur
(1988, 1993), Besley (1990), Keen (1992) and Kanbur et al. (1994) for seminal contributions in
targeting theory and Haddad and Kanbur (1992) for an introduction to intra-household targeting.
3best institutional strategy to reduce child deprivation, they highlight the diﬀerent
aspects that must be included in a theoretical framework like ours.
First of all, several authors exploit variations in the child beneﬁt legislation from
1997 to 2000 in the United Kingdom. Results are mixed. Examining data from
the Family Expenditure Survey, Gregg et al. (2006) show that low-income families
spend a higher share of their budget on children’s clothing and footwear and a
lesser on adults’ clothing than before reforms. In contrast, Blow et al. (2003) ﬁnd
that child beneﬁts are disproportionately spent on alcohol and women’s clothing.
T h e yi n t e r p r e tt h i sa se v i d e n c et h a ta l t r u i s t i cp a r e n t si n s u r et h e i rc h i l d r e na g a i n s t
shocks by spending constant amounts on child goods while unexpected ﬂuctuations
in child beneﬁts are used to consume adult goods. This seems to be conﬁrmed by
Gordon et al. (2000). These authors present some evidence that low-income families
do not spend much less money on children than (slightly) higher-income household
since parents tend to make sacriﬁces to provide their children with essentials. In
these circumstances, increasing cash transfers toward families with children may
end up improving the situation of parents more than that of children.4 These
results have two consequences for our own purpose: (i) our child poverty measure
must account for the fact that children in poor households — according to standard
deﬁnitions — are not necessarily ‘poor’ themselves; (ii) while the degree of altruism
is an empirical question, our model must clarify how household preferences, i.e.,
individual preferences and parents’ altruism, shape household expenses on adult
and child goods.
The speciﬁc instrument considered in aforementioned studies — child beneﬁt—
may produce more than a simple income eﬀect. In particular, the money labeled
as child beneﬁt could be spent disproportionately more on child goods. On this
account too, empirical results are mixed. Some studies ﬁnd indeed a signiﬁcant
labeling eﬀect (Kooreman, 2000, Madden, 1999, Grogan, 2004) while other do not
(Edmonds, 2002). At least three diﬀerent explanations underlie this eﬀect. Firstly,
recipients may use diﬀerent mental accounts for diﬀerent expenditure categories,
a phenomenon which limits the fungibility of income and constraints consumption
patterns in certain ways (Thaler, 1999). Secondly, the label alters adults’ prefer-
ences because they feel a moral obligation to comply with it. Thirdly, the identity
of the recipient in the household may matter, while child beneﬁts are typically paid
to the main carer. In addition, beneﬁt payments may be treated diﬀerently from
other incomes because they diﬀer with respect to their periodicity, to their ﬂuctu-
4Similar conclusions are drawn by Mayer (1997) with US data.
4ation over time, etc. In this case, the eﬀe c tc o u l db ei n v e r s ec o m p a r e dt ot h eu s u a l
labeling eﬀect, i.e., the propensity to spend on children from child beneﬁts could
be smaller than from other incomes as suggested by the interpretation of Blow et
al. (2003) above.
As in Besley and Kanbur (1988), we focus on two archetypal instruments,
namely a price subsidy and a cash transfer. This choice is natural. First, these
policies may be found as such in actual systems. Universal or means-tested child
beneﬁts are in force in many Western countries while several examples of VAT re-
ductions on child-speciﬁc goods exist, e.g., children’s clothing in the United King-
dom and Ireland, milk and nappies in Canada, dairy products, child furniture,
school equipment and a variety of other child goods in Russia. Second, even if
many other policies are suggested to combat child poverty, most instruments boil
down to a combination of price and income eﬀects, and are thereby covered by
our model. There is one important restriction to this statement, however. When
possible, governments impose a means-test on beneﬁts to improve targeting and
reduce costs. Child beneﬁts or tax reduction for the presence of children are often
conditional on the level of income. Therefore, we shall consider this additional
feature in the last section, when treating the relative impact of price and income
policies on child poverty.
Finally, a speciﬁct y p eo ft r a n s f e rw h i c hi sn o te x p l i c i t l yt r e a t e di no u rm o d e l
is in-kind beneﬁts. The latter deserve attention, though, as they are often imple-
mented to support children. These beneﬁts correspond to a ration of a certain
good that is given or made available below the market price. First, the nature of
the oﬀered or subsidized good (e.g., free milk, free school) possibly reﬂects some
paternalistic behaviors of the State. We explicitly extent our model to account for
(de)merit goods hereafter. Second, these beneﬁts can potentially be sold again,
and are thereby presented as equivalent to cash transfers. Nonetheless, labeling
eﬀects may come into play so that this equivalence may not hold. This point is
discussed in the case of food stamps in the US (Currie, 2002, Whitmore, 2002) or
free milk and free lunch vouchers in the UK (Bingley and Walker, 2002).
53 An Altruistic Model of Household Behavior
3.1 Preferences and the Decision Process
In our framework, a household which comprises an adult (a) and a child (c)m a k e s
decisions about consumption.5 The n−vectors of goods consumed by the adult and
t h ec h i l da r ed e n o t e db yxa =( xa
1,...,x a
n)0 and xc =( xc
1,...,x c
n)0, respectively.













where ua(xa) is the adult’s sub-utility function. To make things easier, however,
we use a slightly more restrictive form and suppose that the total utility function







where ρ>0 represents the weight given by the adult to the child.6 The functions
ua(xa) and uc(xc) are strictly increasing, strictly concave and diﬀerentiable in all
their arguments. Note that, in this formulation, there is no diﬀerence between how
the child and the parent perceive child welfare.
We suppose that the adult always gets her way. This seems reasonable for
investigating economic policies that aim at reducing poverty among young children









c) ≤ Y, x
a ≥ 0, x
c ≥ 0 (3)
where p =( p1,...,p n)0 is the vector of prices and Y is the household total income.




5Our analysis can be seen as restricted to lone parents, which is a relevant focus group with
respect to child poverty. We may also suppose that the father and the mother behave as a single
decision maker.
6This simpliﬁcation does not fundamentally alter the main conclusions of the paper.
6where xg (p,Y) denotes the vector of individual demands for the member g (g =
a,c). These functions are traditional Marshallian demands and thus satisfy the
Slutsky condition. Since the optimization program is additively separable, these
demands have other properties that will be examined below.
The present framework is completely standard. In particular, the separability
of the child’s consumption is accepted by the majority of economists, even if not
without reservations (Gronau, 1988), and is a crucial component of the welfare
analysis that follows. The decision process described by the optimization program
(3) is also compatible with the various representations of multi-person households
found in the literature such as the Rotten Kid model (Becker 1974, 1991), the
Consensus model (Samuelson, 1956), the Pareto model (Apps and Rees, 1988) or
the Rothbarth model (Gronau, 1991). The collective model (Chiappori, 1988),
however, diﬀers from our set-up in that the weight of each person in the household
is supposed to be a function of the price system and income.
3.2 The Properties of Household Demands
The separability of the adult’s optimization program allows us to proceed with
a two-stage budgeting interpretation of the decision process. Firstly, income is
divided between the adult and the child according to some rule; secondly, the
consumption vectors are chosen as if each individual maximized her own utility
subject to her own share of income.7




be the member g’s indirect sub-utility function where φg is her share





c (p,φ c) s.t. φa + φc = Y. (5)







Once income is divided between the child and the adult, each of them maximizes






g ≤ φg, x
g ≥ 0. (7)
7Of course, we do not claim that young children actually maximize a utility function. This is
only a convenient representation of the decision process.




where xg(p,φ g) is a vector of Marshallian demands, expressed as functions of p
and φg. To simplify notation, let φ = φc and Y − φ = φa,w h e r eφ(p,Y) is the
‘sharing rule’. This function has properties that we examine below.
3.2.1 The Eﬀect of Income on the Sharing Rule
To compute the derivative of the sharing rule with respect to income, we diﬀeren-































g/λg is a measure of concavity of member g’s sub-utility. This
measure will hereafter be referred to as the (absolute) income ﬂuctuation aversion
of member g. Then, using expressions (6) and (8), the eﬀect of income on the






























Thus, the eﬀect of income on the sharing rule is comprised between zero and
one: the expenditure devoted to the child is a normal good for the adult, which
is hardly controversial.8 Moreover, the share of each additional unit of income
accruing to the child is equal to the ratio of the adult’s aversion to the sum of
both members’ aversion. That is to say, the increment of income will accrue more
importantly to the household member located on the least curve portion of her
utility function. Hence the intuition of Blow et al. (2003), according to which
children are insured against ﬂuctuations in income, means that the child’s utility
function at the equilibrium point is much more concave than that of the husband.
The sum of both members’ income ﬂuctuation aversions, denoted above by θ,
has an attractive interpretation in terms of complementarity: as demonstrated in
8The normality of the child’s welfare, however, is not general but comes from the additivity
property of the adult’s utility function.
8appendix A, it corresponds to the derivative of the benevolent parent’s marginal
rate of substitution, computed at the equilibrium, between the child’s allocation
φ and the parent’s allocation Y − φ (i.e., ∂2φc/∂φ
2
a when the adult’s total utility
is hold constant). In other words, it measures the convexity of the preferences of
the benevolent parent regarding allocations φ and Y − φ. If the latter tend to be
perfect substitutes (complements), the indiﬀerence curve of the altruistic parent
tends to be linear (right-angled) and θ tends to zero (inﬁnity). The term θ will
thus be referred to as an index of complementarity hereafter.
3.2.2 The Eﬀect of Prices on the Sharing Rule
To compute the derivative of the sharing rule with respect to prices, we diﬀerentiate






































































































There are three terms in the right hand side of expression (12). Of course, the last
term is a ‘conventional’ income eﬀect: the child endowment decreases because the
real income of the household is reduced by the rise in the price of good k.T h eﬁrst
two terms play a major role in the derivation of optimal subsidies. They also have
a precise interpretation, which is now examined.
93.2.3 The Interpretation of (xc
k − Rk)
The sum of the ﬁrst two terms in expression (12) can be seen as a compensated eﬀect
of the price pk on the sharing rule. To illustrate this point, let us remark that the
sharing rule coincides, by deﬁnition, with the expenditure made by the household
on the child’s consumption, that is, φ =
Pn
j=1 pjxc
j (p,Y).I fw ed i ﬀerentiate this





























is a traditional substitution term. The last term on the right-hand-side of (14) is
clearly the income eﬀect described above and the ﬁrst term is the variation in the
sharing rule that maintains the child’s utility constant. The second term is thus a
money-metric measure of the variation in the child’s utility induced by the price
increase when the adult’s total utility is maintained constant. The sum of the ﬁrst
two terms is the corresponding compensated eﬀect, that is, the change in the child’s
share resulting from a simultaneous variation in the price pk a n di ni n c o m eY that
keeps the adult’s total utility unaﬀected. Combining these results with expression







and compared to expression (13). It turns out that the sum of the substitution
eﬀects weighted by the prices is proportionate to the diﬀerence between the child’s
and the adult’s Engel curves. This equivalence stems, as explained by Deaton
and Muellbauer (1980), from the separability of the adult’s total utility function
and can be interpreted as follows. First, remark that the real value of a marginal
income unit accruing to a family member depends on the price of the good on
which this member tends to spend the income unit: the more expensive this good,
t h el o w e rt h ep u r c h a s i n gp o w e ro ft h em a r g i n a li n c o m eu n i t( C h r i s t i a n s e n ,1 9 8 3 ,
p. 362). Then, an increase in the price of good k will aﬀect the adult’s trade-oﬀ
between devoting a marginal unit of income to the maximization of her own sub-
utility function or to the maximization of that of her child. The price increase will
depress both members’ purchasing powers, but more so for the child if she has a
10larger propensity to spend on this good, i.e., if the slope of the Engel curve for
good k is steeper for the child than for the adult. This implies a redistribution of
resources from the child to the adult.
3.3 Example: The Complementarity Index
To illustrate the properties of the sharing rule and emphasize the role of the com-
plementarity index, we shall consider the case where the adult’s and the child’s




,w h e r eαg(p)−1
is a linearly homogeneous function of prices p. First, the adult’s and the child’s
















i.e., the impact of the share of income is linear. Similarly, the child’s share of





(lnαc +l nρ − lnαa)
θ
;
thus, the parameter of adult’s altruism inﬂuences the intercept of the sharing rule.
In the CARA speciﬁcation, the individual measures of income ﬂuctuation aversion
are constant and corresponds to αg, so that the complementarity index θ is simply
equal to αa+αc. Computed at the equilibrium, this index coincides with the value
of the second order derivative of the adult’s indiﬀerence curve. Clearly enough,
however, the value of the complementarity index is not invariant to changes in
measurement units; hence its interpretation is complicated. To take a numerical
example, let us suppose that Y = $20,000, αa = αc and ρ =1so that each
member receives $10,000. The indiﬀerence curves for various values of the com-
plementarity index (θ =0 ,θ=1 0 −4,θ=1 0 −3,θ= ∞)a r ed r a w ni nF i g u r e1 .W e
observe that the equilibrium is deﬁned by the point where the ﬁrst derivative of
the indiﬀerence curve is equal to −1 and, at this very point, the second derivative
of the indiﬀerence curve is equal to θ. Moreover, a value of θ greater than 10−3
represents a considerable degree of complementarity.
4 The Impact of Policies on Child Welfare
4.1 The Variations in Child’s Welfare
In the present section, we examine the marginal impact of two standard policies

























Figure 1: The Degree of Complementarity between Adult and Child Incomes in
the Household.
a reduction in the free market price of one good — and lump sum transfers.9 To
do so, we implicitly suppose that (i) the child utility function incorporated in the
benevolent parent’s decision process truly reﬂects child welfare and (ii) the social
planner’s anticipation of the child welfare coincides with that of the adult. In
addition, the analysis is partial in the sense that the producer prices are constant.
One natural interpretation is that prices are determined by world markets.
To begin with, we deﬁne a one-dimension measure of the variation in the child’s
standard of living. The Hicksian variation dV that compensates the child for an

























As is usual, the Hicksian variation dV can be interpreted as a monetary measure
9The study of child poverty necessitates the presence of several households with diﬀerent
income levels, and is postponed until the next section.















which deﬁne the necessary increase in the child’s share to keep her as well oﬀ in
the new environment.
4.2 The Marginal Impact of Subsidies10
The ﬁrst question is then to determine whether a marginal increment of the subsidy
actually improves the child’s welfare and if so, how large is the improvement. To
do so, we assume that each unity of good k is subsidized at a constant rate. Hence
dsk = −dpk > 0 where sk is the subsidy placed on good k.T h u s , i f w e u s e
expression (15) and the Roy’s identity, and we substitute expression (12) for the










The ﬁrst term in this expression, xk (∂φ/∂Y), is positive. This is the traditional
income eﬀect described above. The second term, Rk, represents the distortions
generated by the subsidy that are expected to be favorable to the child. As deﬁned
in equation (13), it is equal to the inverse of the complementarity index multiplied
by the diﬀerence in the slopes of the Engel curves. Speciﬁcally, the subsidy will be
very eﬀective (i) if the complementarity index is small, i.e., there is some substi-
tutability between the child’s and the adult’s welfares, and (ii) if the slope of the
Engel curve of the child is very steep in comparison with that of the adult (and,
in particular, if good k is superior and exclusively consumed by the child). On the
contrary, if the slope of the Engel curve of the adult is large by comparison with
that of the child, the subsidy will generate ‘bad’ distortions and may lead to a
reduction of the child’s well-being. Henceforth, the term Rk will be referred to as
the redistributive or targeting eﬀect of the subsidy.
The eﬀectiveness of an economic policy also depends on its cost. Therefore, we
compute the marginal impact of the subsidy per unit spent by the social planner.
If some goods j (6= k) consumed by the household are taxed (or subsidized), the
10Since the objective of the social planner is to improve the child’s well-being, we concentrate
on the marginal impact of subsidies. The marginal impact of taxes, which is simply the opposite,
also has empirical relevance.
13marginal cost of the subsidy on good k will incorporate the change in tax rev-
enue due to the rise in the subsidy. This change will depend on the existence of
gross substitutability and complementarity relations between good k and the taxed
goods. To make the interpretation of the results easier, however, we thus suppose
that the other goods consumed by the household are untaxed.11 If the total cost of








We suppose that this expression is positive. Thus, the marginal impact in terms













To gain insight into this rule, we compute the marginal welfare gain per budget









· dB.( 1 9 )
Following this expression, the optimal rule for the practitioner who wants to im-
prove children’s welfare is simple: the subsidy must be put on the good for which
the diﬀerence between the slope of the Engel curve of the child and that of the
adult, divided by the level of consumption, is the largest.
4.3 The Income Elasticity Rule
To implement these results, the social planner must have information about the
slopes of Engel curves. However, the identiﬁcation of these curves for goods con-
sumed by both parent and child is complicated. To make things easier, we shall
consider subsidizing goods which are exclusively consumed by the child. This is a
desirable situation since the subsidy will necessarily have a positive targeting eﬀect
(at least if the exclusive goods are normal). Thus, if good k is speciﬁc to children,




















This preliminary information is useful. Indeed, let us assume that goods j and k
are exclusively consumed by the child. Then, if we substitute the value (20) for
the slope in the marginal impact (19), we obtain the following rule-of-thumb.
11Alternatively, we can suppose that the derivative of the demands for the taxed goods with
respect to the price of good k is equal to zero.
14T h eI n c o m eE l a s t i c i t yR u l e : A small subsidy, starting from the no-subsidy











i.e., the income elasticity of good k is greater than that of good j.
The social planner is thus able to select empirically the ‘child-speciﬁc’ good for
which the subsidy will have the largest eﬀect on child welfare. The intuition is
simple. If the income elasticity of the subsidized good is close to zero, the subsidy
will not generate ‘good’ distortions and its impact will simply be comparable to
that of a lump sum transfer. On the contrary, if the income elasticity is positive
and large, the subsidy will generate favorable distortions and induce the adult to
purchase a larger quantity of the subsidized good.
4.4 A Comparison with Lump Sum Transfers
We now suppose that the social planner has the possibility to use lump-sum trans-
fers, such as child beneﬁts, as an additional instrument. The main feature of such
transfers is that they are not associated with dead weight loss. We thus question
whether the increment in the price subsidy is dominated by a similar increment
in a lump-sum transfer, when the social objective is to improve child welfare. To
e x a m i n et h i si s s u e ,w es u p p o s et h a td Y = dT>0 where T is the cash transfer.





The eﬀectiveness of the lump-sum transfer is thus reduced by the fact that the
derivative of the sharing rule is less than one. Then, we can establish the diﬀer-
ence between the welfare gain of the subsidy and that of the cash transfer for a








If this expression is positive, a ﬁscal policy that combines a subsidy placed on good
k ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxation can be implemented to improve child welfare. To
examine that, we use expressions (18) and (21) and show that the marginal impact





sk + Rk ≥ 0. (22)
15In this expression, the ﬁrst term represents the tax leakage of the subsidy (i.e.,
the diﬀerence between the eﬀect of a marginal increase in the subsidy on the
household real income, xk,a n di t se ﬀect on the budget of the social planner,
xk − sk∂xk (p,Y)/∂pk) multiplied by the derivative of the sharing rule, i.e., the
proportion of the tax leakage supported by the child. This is not surprising be-
cause, as is well-known, the welfare cost of a ﬁscal reform that modiﬁes marginal
tax rates and returns the money to the household as a cash transfer is equal to
the tax leakage (Allgood and Snow, 1998). The ﬁrst term is, in principle, negative
but it is counteracted by the second term: the targeting eﬀect. As seen before, the
sign of the targeting eﬀect depends on the diﬀerence between the child’s and the
adult’s Engel curves. However, it is always positive when we consider child-speciﬁc
goods. Interestingly, in the no-subsidy situation, the ﬁr s tt e r mv a n i s h e ss ot h a tt h e
marginal increase in the subsidy has purely a targeting eﬀect. The main conclu-
sion is that a subsidy placed on well-chosen goods (that is, characterized by large
targeting eﬀect) has the potential to dominate cash transfers.12
Another important message from equation (22) is that there is no opportunity
for intra-household targeting through the channel of the price structure if all the in-
dividual demands possess linear Engel curves with common slopes across household
members. In this case, the eﬀect of a subsidy would be, at best, equivalent to that
of a cash transfer. This is quite natural. Indeed Christiansen (1983) demonstrates
that, if Engel curves are linear with a common slope, the ratio of both members’
marginal utility of money is independent of prices. This is also reminiscent of
a result by Deaton (1979) which determines under which conditions a system of
diﬀerential taxes can be optimal to attain redistributive objectives. The intuition
behind this result is that the preferences obey the Gorman polar form (Gorman,
1953) required for exact aggregation of commodity demands. If such aggregation
is possible, then we cannot use variations in prices to distinguish among individual
for purposes of redistribution: a cash transfer exhausts our capacity in this regard.
Finally, the introduction of a subsidy will be more favorable to children than
that of a cash transfer up to the point where expression (22) is equal to zero, which
12Note, however, that a positive labeling eﬀect of the child beneﬁt would play in favor of this
instrument. A simple way to model this eﬀect in our framework consists in writing the weight of
the child as a function of the transfers, i.e. ρ = ρ(T),w i t h ∂ρ/∂T > 0.I nt h i sc a s e ,i tc a nb e
shown that the condition (22) is modiﬁed by the addition of a negative term which translates the
fact that child beneﬁts are disproportionately spent more on child goods than other incomes.
16deﬁnes an upper threshold s∗
















The subsidy will be more eﬀective than the transfer as long as sk <s ∗
k. Therefore,
the optimal subsidy rate on good k is inversely related to its own price elasticity
(the eﬃciency motive, i.e., a typical Ramsey principle) and positively related to
the targeting eﬀect divided by xk (the redistributive motive). If the social planner
assigns a budget B to improve child welfare, the optimal policy mix thus consists in
setting the subsidy on good k to s∗
k and distributing the rest of the public budget,
B − s∗
kxk, as child beneﬁt (or, of course, placing a subsidy on other goods).
4.5 Paternalism and (de)merit Goods
One of the major justiﬁcations for the interference of the social planner with the
household allocation process can be found in the existence of merit or demerit goods
(according to Musgrave’s original terminology).13 In a certain sense, the fact that
the child’s welfare may be deemed a merit good already gives a good reason for the
form of public intervention that is examined in the previous sections. Nevertheless,
the social planner may go one step further and judge that the preferences used by
the adult to determine the child’s needs are a ‘faulty’ representation of the child’s
well-being. To examine this form of paternalism, we then follow and generalize
Besley’s (1988) approach to (de)merit goods.14 That is to say, we suppose that the
social planner values the child’s consumption diﬀerently from the adult and treats






with ¯ xc = δ ¯ xc where δ =( δ1,...,δn)0 is a vector of positive constants and ¯ is
the Hadamard product (i.e., the element-by-element product). If we suppose that
all the δ’s are equal to one except that of good k – in other words, governments
do respect the choices that the adult make for all the goods except one –, we can
classify good k as a merit good if δk > 1 and a demerit good if δk < 1.
13In its most general deﬁnition, the notion of (de)merit goods is suﬃciently vague for our
purpose. In what follows, the merit can be the result of externalities in consumption, lack of
information, community values and so on. See Musgrave (1987) for a deﬁnition of merit goods.
14This formulation may have some counter-intuitive implications that are not examined here.
Schroyen (2005) suggests an alternative approach but the latter is a little more complicated.
17To measure the impact of subsidies, we must compute the child’s indirect utility
function that takes into account the fact that the adult’s decisions are not optimal





This is not a traditional indirect utility function because the demands for goods are
not optimal from the social planner’s perspective. In particular, as is demonstrated






















c(¯ p, ¯ φc)
∂¯ φc
,
with ¯ p = δ ¯ p and ¯ φc = φc +
Pn
j=1 (δj − 1)pjxc
j(p,φ c), is a substitution eﬀect
evaluated with the social planner’s preferences. In other words, the ratio of the
derivatives of the indirect utility function does not coincide with the quantity of the
good consumed because of a term which is equal to a weighted sum of substitution
eﬀects computed with the social planner’s preferences. To interpret this expression,
l e tu sn o t et h a tδk
PN
j=1 pjδj¯ σjk =0from the properties of compensated demands,








pj (1 − δj)¯ σjk
!
.
Hence, the Roy’s identity holds if all the δ’s are equal to one. Using these results













pj (1 − δj)¯ σjk
is, by comparison with the case without (de)merit goods, an additional term which
represents the paternalistic eﬀect of the subsidy. To interpret this expression, let
18us suppose that all the δ’s are equal to one except that of good k. The paternalistic
eﬀect becomes:
Pk = δkpk (1 − δk)¯ σkk.
This term is positive — and reinforces the targeting eﬀect — if good k is a merit
good, and negative if good k is a demerit good. Moreover, its amplitude depends
on the size of the own substitution eﬀect (computed with the utility function of
the social planner). Now, we may suppose that all the δ’s are equal to one except
that of some good j (diﬀerent from good k). The paternalistic eﬀect becomes:
Pk = δkpj (1 − δj)¯ σjk.
The sign of this term depends on whether goods k and j are substitutes or com-
plements. In particular, if goods k and j a r es u b s t i t u t e s ,t h ep a t e r n a l i s t i ce ﬀect
is negative for a merit good and positive for a demerit good. On the contrary, if
goods k and j are complements, the paternalistic eﬀect is positive for a merit good
and negative for a demerit good.
One important conclusion at this stage is that the generalization of the theory
to (de)merit goods is straightforward: almost all the results remain valid except
that the traditional targeting eﬀe c tm u s tb es u p p l e m e n t e db yap a t e r n a l i s t i ce ﬀect.
Hence, to simplify notations, we simply ignore this extension in the remainder.
5T a r g e t i n g C h i l d P o v e r t y
5.1 The Deﬁnition of Child Poverty
I fw en o wc o n s i d e rt h ei s s u eo fp o v e r t y ,s u b s i d i e sm a yn o tb ea sd e s i r a b l ea so t h e r
instruments. In eﬀect, the cash transfer is identical for all households while the
gain due to a subsidy depends on the consumption level of that good. If the good is
normal, the subsidy will beneﬁt more to rich households and miss its target. This
simple idea is formally presented by Besley and Kanbur (1988, 1993). However,
when tackling child poverty, results may diﬀer to the extent that subsidies on
certain goods can have redistributive intra-household eﬀect in favor of children.
This question — whether child subsidies are more eﬃcient to reduce child poverty
than cash transfers — is examined here.
First of all, we specify what we mean by child poverty. Let us assume that
households diﬀer only with respect to the income level Y and denote f(Y ) the
19density function of household income in the population. We posit a poverty line
z so that children with φ(p,Y) 6 z are classiﬁed as being in poverty. Since the
function φ is monotonically increasing in Y , there exists a value Zc representing
the level of household income at the child poverty line and implicitly deﬁned by




f(Y ) · dY.
We then need a (child) poverty index which aggregates information on units below
the poverty line. In what follows, we shall use the income gap measure of poverty,





z − φ(p,Y )
z
¶
f(Y ) · dY.
For our present concerns, this approach is very simple and convenient, even if in-
sensitive to the distribution of income among poor individuals. Further extensions
could look at the results when using alternative measures of poverty.
T h ei m p o r t a n tp o i n tt ob em a d eh e r ei st h a tm e a s u r e so fc h i l dp o v e r t yu s u a l l y
assume that children in poor households (e.g., households with income below 50%
of the median) are children in poverty. Whether this is the case or not depends on
how income is shared within the household. Originally, in our framework, we need
not to assume equal sharing and focus on resources actually accruing to children
to deﬁne child poverty. This way, the level of household income Zc,d e ﬁning the
limit of child poverty, does not necessarily give a poverty line for the household as
a whole or for the adult.
In the following, we assume that the government targets redistributive policies
at households with income below Za. In other words, only the Za-population will
beneﬁt from the subsidy or the cash transfer. In practice, the choice of the means-
test level Za will depend on the information available on household incomes and
children costs. We shall consider two polar cases in the sequel: (i) the government
is able to identify and target households containing poor children as previously
deﬁned, i.e., Za = Zc; (ii) income test is not possible or not desirable and both
cash transfers and price subsidies are universal, i.e., Za corresponds to the highest
income in the population. Notice that our problem is monotonous. If Za <Z c,
then φ(p,Z a) <z , i.e., the ‘richest’ among the poor children will not be targeted.
Inversely, if Za >Z c, the poorest among non-poor children will be targeted.
205.2 The Marginal Impact of Subsidies and Transfers
















f(Y ) · dY (25)





















f(Y ) · dY
are the demand for good k and its derivative averaged over the Za-population. We
then investigate the eﬀect on the child poverty measure of a marginal increment in
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Rkf(Y ) · dY
are the income eﬀect and the targeting eﬀect of the subsidy, averaged over the pop-
ulation of households with a child in poverty. The interpretation of this expression
is analogous to that of expression (18). In particular, the subsidy will decrease
child poverty if the average targeting eﬀect is positive. However, the cost of the
policy is evaluated over the Za-population.


























f(Y ) · dY.
The comparison of the marginal impact of the subsidy and the marginal impact of


































The ﬁrst two terms are close to those in expression (22) while the last term resem-
bles that in Besley and Kanbur (1988). The ﬁrst term, corresponding to the tax
leakage of the price distortion, is negative but may be set arbitrarily small. The
second term is always positive for (normal) child-speciﬁcg o o d s .T h el a s tt e r m ,i n
square brackets, will generally be negative if there is no means-test. It will be all
the smaller as we move from universal to means-tested instruments. To show this,






× [Ec (xk) − Ea (xk)].
If both instruments are universal, i.e., Ea is the average over the whole population,
this expression is certainly negative since the mean consumption in families with
poor children is less than the mean consumption in the population. In this case, the
targeting eﬀect of price subsidies must be strong for condition (28) to be respected.
On the other hand, the means-test of redistributive policies, as often implemented
in developed countries, may considerably reduce the size of the third term. In the
extreme case where the means-test allows a perfect targeting at poor children, i.e.,
if Za = Zc, this last term is null and the price subsidy is unambiguously preferred.15
15This conclusion is valid only if ∂φ/∂Y is independent of xk. However, there are reasons to
believe that ∂φ/∂Y is negatively correlated to xk. I nt h a tc a s e ,t h et e r mi ns q u a r eb r a c k e t si n
expression (28) will be negative even for Za = Zc.
225.3 Example: Transfers versus Subsidies
We suppose that means-test is not possible and extend the preceding example with
utility functions of the CARA form. The individual demands are linear in φg, i.e.,
x
g
k = agφg,w h e r eag = −((∂αg/∂pk)/αg), and the sharing rule is an aﬃne function
of Y ,i . e . ,φ = η1 + η2Y so that z = η1 + η2Zc. Suppose that the targeting eﬀect
is positive for good k,t h a ti s ,ac >a a. We then assume that household incomes
are uniformly distributed between zero and an upper bound, ¯ Y . In that case, the
proportion of households with a child in poverty is denoted by H = Zc/¯ Y and the






[(ac − aa)η1 +( aa(1 − η2)+acη2)Y ] · dY
= A + BE(Y ), with E(Y )=Y/2
where A =( ac − aa)η1 > 0 and B =( aa(1 − η2)+acη2) are the parameters of the
household demand for good k.
We shall now compute the marginal impacts of the two policies at the no-subsidy
situation. Using expressions (26) and (27), we obtain the marginal impact of the



















× [A + BE(Y )]
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× H × η2.
Taking the diﬀerence between these two expressions and simplifying, we demon-
strate that (from the no-subsidy situation) the subsidy is more eﬃcient than the
transfer if and only if the following condition is satisﬁed:
θE(Y ) <
A
Bη1η2 (1 − H)
.
In particular, the subsidy is especially desirable when the complementarity index
(multiplied by average income as a normalization) is small and the poverty rate is




2 (1 − H)
. (29)
In this case, the condition does not depend on the parameters of the demand. To
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Dashed lines represent reasonable bounds of the complementarity index (10E-4 and 10E-3 respectively). For two different levels of child poverty η, black 
lines represent limits below which price subsidies are prefered to cash transfers. 
Figure 2: Dominance of Price Subsidy over Cash Transfer in Function of the Levels
of Child Povety and Complementarity Index.
$20,000 and sketch the relation between H and θ as given by inequality (29).
In Figure 2, this relation is represented by the upper (lower) line for η2 =0 .25
(η2 =0 .50). Dotted horizontal lines depict θ =1 0 −3 and θ =1 0 −4, which are, as
previously seen, realistic upper and lower bounds for θ. If the fraction of Y given to
the child is relatively small (η2 =0 .25), the subsidy is more eﬃcient than transfers
— true in the area below the upper line — even for a large complementarity index
and a small poverty rate. If the child allocation is relatively large (η2 =0 .50),t h e
subsidy is more eﬃcient than transfers only if the complementarity index is very
small (θ ≈ 0.0002).
6C o n c l u s i o n
Using a general representation of households with children, we have (i) broken
down the total eﬀect of price subsidies on child welfare into various components
(an income eﬀect, a targeting eﬀect and, possibly, a paternalistic eﬀect); (ii) ex-
tracted the set of goods to subsidize in order to yield the largest gain in child
24welfare; (iii) characterized the conditions under which a subsidy dominates child
beneﬁts in increasing child welfare; (iv) deﬁned the optimal level of price subsidies
and the optimal policy mix when both subsidies and direct transfers are allowed.
Importantly, the eﬀectiveness of a subsidy (or a tax) as a targeting device depends
on the responsiveness of individual consumptions to variations of incomes. In ad-
dition, we have extended these results to the problem of poverty alleviation. In
particular, the reduction in child poverty may be larger using well-chosen subsidies
rather than cash transfers if child poverty is high and the complementarity between
the parent’s and the child’s shares is small.
We believe that the suggested framework is an original attempt to characterize
policies aimed to target at certain individuals within the household. With the sug-
gested model, it becomes possible to assess the relative cost eﬃciency of most policy
instruments used to alleviate child poverty. Naturally, future work should overcome
some of the primary limitations of this contribution. First, the production side has
been ignored in our partial equilibrium analysis. If the supply of subsidized goods is
very rigid, its price will increase as the subsidy is introduced and exchanged quanti-
ties will not change, canceling distortions but also the targeting eﬀect. Second, our
analysis has considered only private goods, while the level of public consumption
achieved by the household can be crucial for the welfare of children. Measures of
material deprivation often include public durable goods. Nonetheless, it is possi-
ble to extend the present model to public goods, as done in the collective model
literature. Third, households diﬀer only with the level of income while introducing
heterogeneity with respect to other characteristics (household size, the degree of
parent’s altruism, etc.) would be a diﬃcult but important extension.
Our concluding words concern the empirical implementation of the theoretical
tools developed in this paper using real data. The components of the structural
model that are retrieved by simple estimations on families with children are suﬃ-
cient to compute optimal subsidy rates on child-speciﬁc goods. In the less restrictive
case where all types of goods are to be subsidized, the targeting eﬀect of a subsidy
must be recovered empirically. To achieve this, the easiest way consists in employ-
ing a Rothbarth-like method (Gronau, 1991), which allows the econometrician to
recover the share of income accruing to the child, provided that at least one good
is not consumed by the child. Then, the eﬀect of prices on the sharing rule can be
broken down into an income eﬀect and a targeting eﬀect. The identiﬁcation of the
targeting eﬀect will allow us to extract the set of goods for which the subsidy will
be the most eﬀective. This is the objective of future research.
25Appendix
A. The Interpretation of the Complementarity Index
If we write the index maximized by the benevolent parent as: Ua = va (p,φ a)+
ρvc (p,φ c);t h e nw ec o m p u t et h em a r g i n a lr a t eo fs u b s t i t u t i o nb e t w e e nt h es h a r e
of the adult and that of the child as follows:
∂φc
∂φa








A measure of the convexity of the indiﬀerence curve of the benevolent parent with









































Then, the term θ can also be seen as the derivative of the parent’s marginal rate
of substitution between φ and (Y − φ) with respect to the relative implicit prices
of child and adult allocations.
B. The Paternalistic Indirect Utility
T h eb a s i cpo i n ti st h a tt h es o l u t i o no ft h eﬁrst order conditions for the maximization
of the social planner’s representation of the child’s welfare is equal to that of the
adult’s representation for a convenient choice of shadow prices and shadow income.





where ¯ pj = δjpj is the shadow price of good j. The corresponding shadow income
can be written as:






Hence, the adult behaves as if she maximized the social planner’s representation
of the child’s utility function, though without perceiving the true system of prices
and the true sharing rule, that is,
x
c(p,φ c)=¯ x
c(¯ p, ¯ φc). (31)
26If we diﬀerentiate this expression with respect to φc and use the deﬁnition of the
shadow income (30), we can show that the Engel curve slopes associated to these

















where the term in parentheses on the right-hand-side represents a money metric
measure of the variation in the child’s welfare, as perceived by the social planner,
that results from an increase in the child’s share. Similarly, if we diﬀerentiate
























If we use the relation between the slopes of the Engel curves (32) and the Slutsky
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Multiplying both members by pk,s u m m i n go v e re a c hk and using the Cournot and
Engel aggregation conditions give:
n X
k=1













This relation establishes a link between the substitution eﬀects associated to xc(p,φ c)
and ¯ xc(¯ p, ¯ φc) respectively. This expression as well as expression (32) above will be
used to compute the Roy Identity for the paternalistic indirect utility function.













































k=1 ¯ pk (∂xc
k(p,φ c)/∂pj)
Pn
k=1 ¯ pk (∂xc
k(p,φ c)/∂φc)
.
The Roy’s identity does not apply here. If we use the Slutsky equation and expres-
sions (32) and (33) above, we obtain formula (24) in the main text.
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